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Abstract—Mining is one of the core elements of the proof-of-
work based cryptocurrency economy. In this paper we investigate
the generic landscape and hierarchy of miners on the example
of Ethereum and Zcash, two blockchains that are among the
top 5 in terms of USD value of created coins. Both chains
used ASIC resistant proofs-of-work which favors GPU mining in
order to keep mining decentralized. This however has changed
with recent introduction of ASIC miners for these chains. This
transition allows us to develop methods that might detect hidden
ASIC mining in a chain (if it exists), and to study how the
introduction of ASICs effects the decentralization of mining
power. Finally, we describe how an attacker might use public
blockchain information to invalidate the privacy of miners,
deducing the mining hardware of individual miners and their
mining rewards.
Index Terms—blockchain, mining, ASIC, Zcash, Ethereum
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of Bitcoin [1] the proof-of-work pro-
tocol is regarded as a revolutionary new consensus protocol
that allows up to 50% malicious participants in an open P2P
network (modulo Selfish-mining attacks). Its core building
block is mining, which requires a participant to solve a
cryptographic puzzle, where the most efficient way of solving
is random guessing. Every time a user solves this puzzle, he
becomes a leader in the consensus protocol and creates a new
block of accepted transactions. In order to control the number
of blocks, the difficulty of the puzzle is dependent on the
overall hashing power of the network. The process of randomly
guessing correct values to solve the puzzle is called mining.
After the launch of Bitcoin in 2009 only a few enthusiasts
were mining with their desktop CPUs. As time went by and
Bitcoin gained more traction, the users started experimenting
how to gain higher and more stable profits from mining bit-
coins. At first the more efficient GPU miners were introduced
publicly in October 2010. On the other hand as the number
of miners was quickly increasing, the expected time to mine
a block became longer than a year.
This led to the birth of mining pools. At the end of
November 2010 the first mining pool was launched. The idea
was to join multiple miners into one large entity, where they
would share the mining rewards based on the amount of work
done towards the mining of the coin. The idea quickly took
off, and in today’s cryptocurrency world solo miners are a
rarity.
Since then in Bitcoin and several other blockchains the main
hardware to mine are application-specific integrated circuits
(ASICs). On the other hand there are chains that aim to
prevent ASICs and use ASIC resistant proof-of-works that
favor GPU mining. One of the reasoning behind this decision
is the attempt at making the chain more decentralized. Our
paper mainly focuses on two such chains, namely Ethereum
and Zcash. In these chains ASICs have been only recently
introduced, and the community have not decided completely
whether they want to defend against them or not.
Firstly in our paper we describe a general landscape of
miners in these chains using both blockchain and mining
pool information. This includes describing the most popular
hardware per chain, what the distribution of mining power
between miners is, and how GPU mined coins compare to
each other in terms of profitability.
Following that, with the introduction of ASICs, questions
arose whether hidden ASIC mining existed in the chain before
the announcements of such hardware. We have developed
methods that might be able to detect hidden ASIC mining
based on mining software developer fees and the distribution
of the mining power. In the observed chain (Zcash) we could
give a bound on hidden ASIC mining (showing no significant
hidden ASICs). The same metrics did change drastically after
the public introduction of ASIC hardware to the network. We
have also studied how the introduction of ASICs effects the
decentralization of mining power.
Lastly, using the previously acquired knowledge on miners
in these chains and the public blockchain information, we
describe how an attacker might deduce the individual mining
rewards and the mining hardware of a single miner, violating
the privacy of miners. We also provide some countermeasures
how a miner might mitigate the leakage of privacy by the
choice of a mining pool and the usage of their rewards.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Mining pools have been receiving a larger attention recently,
but mostly from a game-theoretic point of view. Eyal et al. [2]
introduced the selfish miner attack, where colluding miners
obtain a revenue larger than their fair share, which proves the
bitcoin protocol is not incentive compatible. For the attack
only 1/4 of the mining power is required, compared to the
previous 1/2 bound.
Later Eyal in [3] provides a game theoretic analysis on
competing mining pools attacking each other by seemingly
joining the opposing pool, but not providing any actual proof-
of-work. The paper calls the decision whether to attack the
opponent pool or not the miner’s dilemma. Later Tsavary and
Eyal extended this work in [4].
We have not seen an in-depth analysis of mining pools and
miners in the literature and thus we provide it in this paper. Our
analysis is mainly based on two mining pools which participate
in both Ethereum and Zcash respectively. These are the pools
ran by BitFly called Ethermine for Ethereum and Flypool for
Zcash, and Nanopool for both Ethereum and Zcash. We have
chosen them because the average and current power of each
worker per miner is accessible through their API, if an attacker
learns the exact Zcash or Ethereum address of the miner. In
order to obtain the list of addresses in case of Ethereum an
attacker can acquire this information by scanning the chain for
transactions sent from the pools’ main address in recent time.
We have collected over a 100,000 addresses. In case of Zcash,
we have implemented the techniques presented in the papers
by Kappos et al. and Biryukov et al. [5], [6] to retrieve the
mining payout transactions and build up a database of miner
addresses, which consists of ∼25,000 addresses.
III. MINING LANDSCAPE
Ethermine is the largest, while Nanopool is the third largest
Ethereum mining pool. Flypool was dominating the Zcash
mining power with over 50% hash rate until the recent in-
troduction of ASICs, and is currently the number four mining
pool, while Nanopool was the second largest pool at a time,
while currently it is eighth in rankings.
We were specifically interested in the workers, their mo-
mentary and average power, and their names, as we have
noticed that miners often name them after the hardware itself.
Overall we have acquired detailed worker information for
21,000 miners in Zcash and 52,000 in Ethereum. In these
data sets we searched for the keywords of the card numbers
or names. If we reduce the workers to ones that have a
descriptive name, the dataset is reduced to roughly 10% of
all the workers. Afterwards the histogram of the average
hash rates of these workers is printable, and combining this
information with the online reported hash rates for the different
kinds of hardware, we can attach specific hardware to specific
hash rates. Ethereum and Zcash use two very different ASIC
resistant proof-of-work algorithms called Ethash and Equihash
respectively. Their hash rates are measured in Mhashes per
second for Ethash and solutions (Sol) per second for Equihash.
A. Ethereum
First, let us investigate Ethereum. Notice the periodic peaks
in the histograms (Figure 1,2,3,4). These peaks represent the
number of cards in the worker. For example in the case of the
GTX 1050 we can distinguish 6 separate peaks at 14, 28, 42,
56, 70 and 84 Mhash/s respectively. Also notice that the peaks
are getting wider, as the miners over- or underclock their cards
by different amounts, which results in larger deviation as the
number of cards increases.
Overall the most popular cards are the RX 580, RX 570 and
GTX 1060 with around 6,000 workers for each. The exact data
and the rest of cards that are worth mentioning are presented
in Table I.
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Fig. 1: Histogram of hash rates
in Ethereum for the GTX 1050
GPU
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Fig. 2: Histogram of hash rates
in Ethereum for the GTX 1060
GPU
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Fig. 3: Histogram of hash rates
in Ethereum for the GTX 1070
GPU
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Fig. 4: Histogram of hash rate
in Ethereum for the RX 580
GPU
B. Zcash
In Zcash the most popular card is the GTX 1060 and its
different configurations, depending on how many of them are
in a rig. The periodic peaks are observable here as well (Figure
5,6,7,8), although in this case the difference between the hash
rate of cards is much larger than in Ethereum.
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Fig. 5: Histogram of hash rates
in Zcash for the GTX 1050
GPU
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Fig. 6: Histogram of hash rates
in Zcash for the GTX 1060
GPU
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Fig. 7: Histogram of hash rates
in Zcash for the GTX 1070
GPU
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Fig. 8: Histogram of hash rates
in Zcash for the GTX 1080
GPU
The larger difference in hash rate between cards provides a
better distinction between the different rigs. In Table II we
present the most popular rig configurations and their hash
rates, while in Table III we present the most common cards
and the number of times they appear.
Hardware Num Hardware Num Hardware Num
GTX1050 631 GTX1050ti 856 GTX1060 5800
p106 1543 GTX1070 3327 GTX1070ti 616
GTX1080 855 GTX1080ti 1023
RX460 656 RX470 3713 RX480 1650
RX560 1084 RX570 6068 RX580 6273
TABLE I: Number of times a card name has been recorded in
our chosen Ethereum mining pools
Hash rate Suspected Hardware Hash rate Suspected Hardware
150 Sol/s GTX1050 870 Sol/s 3xGTX1060
270 Sol/s GTX1060 1100 Sol/s 2xGTX10804xGTX1060
450 Sol/s GTX1070 1400 Sol/s 2xGTX1080TI5xGTX1060
550 Sol/s GTX10802xGTX1060 1670 Sol/s
3xGTX1080
6xGTX1060
700 Sol/s GTX1080TI
TABLE II: Hash rates and their hardware counterparts
C. GPU Mining
In order to build a more complete picture we investigated
Equihash and GPU mining in general, to have a better un-
derstanding of the dynamics of mining. First, we built an
overview of the total Equihash-based mining ecosystem by
adding up hash rates of every major blockchain using Equihash
as its PoW. We show the total Equihash hash rate of these
chains in Figure 9. We have identified Zcash (ZEC), Bitcoin
Gold (BTG), Zencash (ZEN) and Zclassic (ZCL) as the main
chains. If a chain doesn’t appear on the graph until a certain
point in time, it is either because it didn’t exist before (Bitcoin
Gold), or its hash rate was only marginal (less then 5 MSol/s1)
compared to current Zcash. The huge increase in Zclassic’s
power in January and February 2018 is caused by a huge price
increase during that time (prior to the BTCP-fork). Some of
this power temporarily migrated from Ethereum or other GPU-
mined coins.
The most notable feature of this graph is the exponential
increase in mining power from June-December 2018 which is
due to the introduction of ASIC miners in Zcash.2
One more observation regarding the topic of GPU mining
is comparing Equihash mining to other ASIC-resistant PoWs.
We have chosen Ethereum and Monero3, as they are among
the largest GPU mined coins. We compare the hash rate and
the profitability of these Blockchains in Figures 10-11 by
converting all rates into Sol/s. This is done by comparing the
mining capabilities of the same GPUs on the different PoWs.
The interesting observation in this graph is that even when
there was a peak in Equihash mining (Oct 2017), compared to
the sum there is no visible difference. This is caused by brief
15 MSol/s is 5,000,000 hashes (Equihash solutions) per second.
2A small bump in the graph in Oct 2017 can not be explained directly, but
is most likely a result of temporary ETH miner migration when ETH difficulty
was rapidly increasing due to difficulty-bomb. It went back to normal when
the difficulty bomb was defused by Ethereum hard-fork.
3By popular belief Monero’s CryptoNight algorithm had hidden ASIC
mining which was forked off. A large mining power drop after the fork is
visible in the graph.
Hardware Num Hardware Num Hardware Num
GTX1050 327 GTX1050ti 183 GTX1060 1783
GTX1070 791 GTX1070ti 207 GTX1080 918
GTX1080ti 617 GTX970 157
TABLE III: Number of times a card name has been recorded
in our chosen Zcash mining pools
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Fig. 9: Overall Equihash mining power over time (Purple:
Zcash, Blue: Bitcoin Gold, Green: Zencash, Red: Zclassic)
miner migration from Ethereum mining to Zcash mining for
better profitability.
Figure 11 also shows that after the introduction of ASICs in
Zcash, the profitability curve has crossed the GPU-profitability
line (green line ”BASE”), calculated assuming an electricity
price of 0.05 USD/kWh. Following graphs confirm that there
are probably no GPU miners left in Zcash.
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Fig. 10: Sum of total power of (formerly) GPU-mined
blockchains (Purple: Zcash, Dark Blue: ZenCash, Light Blue:
Bitcoin Gold, Green: Zclassic, Orange: Monero, Yellow:
Ethereum)
D. GPU vs ASIC mining
Both chains (Zcash and Ethereum) use ASIC resistant
proofs-of-work which favor GPU mining in order to keep
mining decentralized. This however has changed with recent
introduction of ASIC miners for these chains around May-June
2018. The ASIC over GPU efficiency improvement is currently
around 2-5x for Ethereum’s Ethash, and 10-30x efficiency
improvement for Zcash’s Equihash.
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Fig. 11: Profitability in USD of different chains originally
using GPU mining. (Red: Zcash, Blue: Ethereum, Orange:
Monero, Green: GPU profitability line)
IV. DETECTING ASIC MINERS
On May 3 the ASIC manufacturer Bitmain announced an
ASIC miner for Equihash (and another company, Innosilicon
later as well). Bitmain is one of the biggest ASIC provider
companies in the world, while also having large shares in
mining power in Bitcoin, and other large cryptocurrencies.
These announcements raise the questions when did these
companies develop an ASIC, did they launch and test it on
Equihash-based cryptocurrencies before the announcement?
Were ASIC miners present in the Zcash mining ecosystem
before their official shipment dates, and if yes, to what extent?
The following two techniques were aimed at trying to answer
these questions. First we show our techniques only until June
2018, as the ASIC hardware only started shipping then. Later
we show how the metrics we presented changed with ASICs.
A. Fraction of large miners in the mining power
Using the techniques from the papers on Zcash transaction
linkability one can link most of the mining reward transactions.
It is also relatively straightforward to approximate the mining
power of an address based on the rewards it gets (how much
value, in what time span and relative to the total Hash rate).
This can be used to monitor the power of larger miners in
the ecosystem (over 8KSol/s, Figure 12). We show this graph
with some added information containing the exact fraction of
large miners, and the daily exchange rate as well.
B. Mining Software Developer Fees
The most popular software for GPU mining is closed source,
and has built-in developer fees. This is generally 2% of the
mining rewards, and enforced by e.g. mining to the developers
address for 72 seconds every hour (2% of an hour). Even
though the developers usually try to obfuscate this address, we
could find the fee addresses of all the major GPU software
miners. By estimating the mining power of these addresses
based on the previous approach, and then multiplying this
power by 50 for the 2% rate4, we can have an estimate on
4At the beginning various miners had different fees at the start from 2-15%
but it seems they converged to 2% over time.
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Fig. 12: Estimated portion of large miners with mining power
of at least 8KSol/s, with the exact fraction in green and the
ZEC/USD exchange rate in blue added
the mining power for GPU Equihash miners. The interesting
and important point is that even if some other Equihash-based
currency is mined with such software, the dev-fee is still sent
to the Zcash mining pools. This is because the same software
can be used to mine most of the Equihash-based coins.
We have produced this graph as well (Figure 13), where it
shows about 80% rate for the first 6 months, and than reduces
to about 60%, to later increase again to 80%. With this we
can give an estimate that at least 80% of the Equihash mining
power till May 2018 was provided by GPUs.
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Fig. 13: Lower bound of GPU mining power based on the
developer fees (Green: Claymore, Blue: EWBF, Purple: dstm,
Light Blue: Bminer, Orange: Optiminer, Red: Remaining Hash
rate). The green line presents the covered percentage.
From the month April 2017 there is an exponential difficulty
increase (from about 50 MSol/s to 200 MSol/s) but only
linear dev-fee fraction decrease from 0.8 to 0.6. ASIC or
FPGA mining would have different effect – exponential dev-
fee decrease. Explanation could be that large farms learned
to disable dev-fee or (more likely) a good free miner has
appeared or we did not find some extra dev-fee address. The
exponential difficulty increase is most likely caused by the
ZEC price hike.
We also see almost linear increase from July 2017 until
March 2018 and in the last 3 months a slight linear decrease
in Figure 9. However secret ASIC or FPGA linearly growing
dominance should show as a linear decrease in the dev-fee
ratio in Figure 13, which we do not observe.
CAVEAT: Dev-fee is an interesting metric, but if it is known
to the adversary, it can be cheated by sending a fraction of the
ASIC mining results as fees to dev addresses. Also we hope
that developers of software miners do not run mining rigs
pointed to the same addresses - this is unlikely but can not be
completely ruled out.
C. Public Introduction of ASICs
At the start of June 2018 the first ASIC miners were shipped
by the companies Innosilicon and Bitmain, which means the
previous two methods can be used to inspect the data when
it is known that there are ASICs in the network. As seen in
Figure 15 the proportion of large miners have visibly increased
and below 35KSol/s miners disappeared from the network.
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Fig. 14: The recent change
in the projected mining power
from dev-fees for the overall
Equihash hash rate
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Fig. 15: The change in mining
power distribution inside the
mining pools.
The projected GPU mining power from developer fees have
also exponentially decreased as seen in Figure 14, which
is a predictable effect of ASIC dominance over the mining
landscape and GPUs becoming unprofitable.
V. MINING CENTRALIZATION
The decreasing projected power from dev-fees and the
increasing overall hash rate lead to questions about the de-
centralization of mining power for Zcash as an effect of the
introduction of ASICs. To have a more detailed view on the
problem, we have investigated the attributes of mining power
in mining pools in more detail in the Zcash and Equihash
ecosystem.5
If we take a look at the graph of the proportion of large
miners, the increase of large miners is obvious, while the
actual number of average daily recorded miners that we have
recorded went down from around 60,000 in the middle of
April to around 13,000 by the end of November 2018 (Figure
16). It is visible that miners started leaving in the beginning
of June 2018, and that tendency is still observable. This also
shows how the introduction of ASICs might alienate GPU
miners from a chain, resulting in a more centralized mining
5The appearance of a close to 40% mining power in the beginning of
June 2018 resulted in questions from the community about who could have
such a large mining stake as an unidentified solo miner. Two weeks after its
appearance its power was distributed into 2 separate addresses (later to even
more addresses, while now it is under one address again), but probably it was
controlled by the same entity all the time.
infrastructure. The picture has to be taken with a caveat, since
theoretically a GPU miner with several mining rigs could point
them to different mining addresses, though this is not very
likely.
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Fig. 16: Number of daily recorded miners in mining pools
since April 2018. The number of small miners using probably
only one rig has decreased from 50,000 to 5,000, while the
middle portion has decreased from 10,000 to 4,000.
VI. PRIVACY OF MINERS
Miners might not want to reveal any information about
themselves, especially if they are mining on a blockchain like
Zcash, where privacy is the main feature. In that case mining
on pools like Flypool or Nanopool is not advisable, as the
information is publicly available for anybody who knows the
miner’s address. On the other hand we can still deduce most
of the mining pool payouts from the public blockchain, which
leads us to the question what can we learn about a miner if
the only thing we see about them are their mining rewards on
the blockchain?
A. Linkability of Mining rewards
Based only on blockchain information, we could record
thousand of miners’ approximate hash rates. This is based on
three different metrics. The first one is the exact value of the
reward, the second is the average chain hash rate since the
last time that miner received a reward, and the third one is the
number of blocks since that last reward payment. Combining
this information we can estimate the mining power of that
miner for that span of blocks. The more rewards the miner
gets, the more precise our estimate can be. We do this analysis
on example of GPU miners but it can be done for ASIC miners
as well. First we have recorded all mining powers, and the ones
under 3.5 KSol/s are displayed in the following histogram,
where the width of a column is 5 Sol/s.
It is noticeable that the histogram follows a sum of inde-
pendent Gaussian distributions, also called Gaussian mixture
model (mining follows a Poisson distribution, but if the distri-
bution’s λ parameter is large enough, it can be approximated
with a normal distribution). The obvious peaks are at 150,
270 and 550 Sol/s, etc. which correspond to popular mining
cards or rigs. After this observation, one could manually or
algorithmically fit a sum of Gaussians with different weights
onto the histogram.
Fig. 17: Histogram of recorded hash rates in Zcash. The striped
line is the Gaussian fitting. The separate colours are the single
Gaussians.
Gaussian decomposition confirms results we observed ear-
lier about popular cards/rigs in Table II. We consider this as a
validation of our metrics, and it means that an attacker might
be able to extract more information from the recorded hash
rates, if all those rate are connected to the same miner. Based
on these values an attacker can observe how stable a miner’s
hash rate is. If there is a significant increase of power, that
stays the same for a long time, one can suspect that new
hardware has been added to the miner’s farm. As we have a
general idea of the possible rigs and hardware, we can reduce
the list of possible new hardware (Figure 18).
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Fig. 18: Example for the case where a miner adds new hard-
ware to its mining rig. In this case the power increases from
around 600 Sol/s to around 850-900 Sol/s, which suggests that
the miner added a GTX 1060 GPU.
From this information an attacker might deduce at what
time a shipment of GPU or ASIC hardware was delivered to
the miner. It might relate to geographical relations as well. For
example if there is a GPU shortage, there might be information
on when do different regions receive their new batches of
specialized hardware. Correlating it with increases in mining
power might reveal information on the geolocation of a miner.
Vice-versa from increases in mining power one might deduce
the batch schedules of hardware manufacturer.
B. Countermeasures
As the accuracy of an attacker’s measurements depends on
the regularity of rewards, we suggest using a large reward
payment threshold, as the fluctuations in the global hash
rate combined with the irregularity of payouts could generate
enough noise such that the miner’s power would be difficult
to estimate correctly.
Next, even though instant payouts might sound as a user-
friendly aspect for a mining pool, it results in even more
accurate approximations. We also suggest frequent change
of mining addresses, which would result in not enough data
points for the attacker.
The drawback of constantly using new addresses is that
when the miner wants to spend his/her coins, it should not
do it in a single transaction from all of the addresses, because
if all the addresses are inputs to the same transaction, then an
attacker knows that all those addresses are controlled by the
same entity. Instead, in the case of Zcash our suggestion is
converting the coins to hidden z-addresses. In Ethereum one
might consider mining to a smart contract instead of a direct
account, and then withdrawing the coins from the contract.
This approach would be still visible on the chain, but it is a bit
harder to follow for an attacker, as it would involve analyzing
the byte-code.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented an overview on decentral-
ized GPU mining in cryptocurrencies. We have studied the
most popular mining hardware, while also investigating the
effect of introduction of ASICs in the mining ecosystem. We
have provided methods that could be used to detect hidden
ASIC farms in a network, and verified their effectiveness in
practice. We have also shown how the overall effect of ASICs
and reduced exchange rates damage the decentralization of
mining power, leading to a disappearance of over 75% of the
miners in Zcash.
Finally we have shown how using only blockchain informa-
tion an attacker can learn the hash rate of a miner and might
even deduce the structure of their mining rigs reducing their
privacy. This study helps to expose privacy vulnerabilities in
the current mining ecosystem which is crucial for privacy-
preserving currencies and privacy-conscious users. It can also
help to understand decentralization effects of GPU vs. ASIC
hardware mining.
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